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Abstract 
It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common 
Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to 
be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a 
correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of 
papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. 
Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent 
literature on causal inference generally, which has moved on to consider 
the virtues of a generalised PCC-inspired condition, the so-called Causal 
Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper we argue that the CMC is an 
appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the 
EPR correlations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements 
on EPR by defenders of the CMC.  
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1  Introduction 
Questions regarding the status of causation in quantum mechanics are as ancient 
as the discipline itself. The founding parents of quantum mechanics often 
identified causation with determinism and consequently understood the 
emergence of the fundamentally probabilistic quantum mechanics as the demise 
of a causal picture of the world. As a consequence quantum theory is often 
presented as non-causal.1 The identification of causality and determinism was 
rather universal: even those who regretted the demise of a causal picture 
attempted to restore a causal understanding of quantum mechanics precisely by 
restoring determinism. For instance, David Bohm showed von Neumann’s 
theorem against hidden variables to involve essentially questionable premises, 
thus paving the way for hidden variables. But while Bohm and von Neumann 
disagreed regarding the status of causation in quantum mechanics, they agreed 
that the fortunes of causation and determinism were essentially linked. Bohm’s 
theory is in essence a programme to endow quantum mechanics with an 
underlying deterministic dynamics.  
The identification causality = determinism (let us call it the “c=d identity”) 
has continued in different, not always explicit, guises. For example Bell’s 
theorem and the work leading up to it during the 1960’s presupposes the 
notorious factorizability condition as a criterion of local causality. Factorizability 
is applicable to the correlations between measurement outcomes of spatially 
separated systems in EPR-like set-ups. Bell’s theorem demonstrated that no 
“factorizable” theory can reproduce the quantum correlations. It is thus 
concluded that Bell’s work shows that not only quantum mechanics but any other 
empirically indistinguishable theory would be non-causal in this sense. But 
philosophers have shown that Bell’s theorem does not entail a departure from the 
c=d identity. Some brilliant work by philosophers of physics in the early 1980’s 
showed that the factorizability condition implies determinism when applied to the 
EPR perfect anti-correlations.2 So in the end it turns out that the rejection of local 
causality promoted by Bell’s theorem also presupposes a rejection of 
determinism, and is hence compatible with the c=d identity.  
Many physicists have continued to presuppose the c=d identity, sometimes 
unquestioningly so. Philosophers of science by contrast long ago started to work 
out the details of a stochastic view of causality. On this view causation is 
essentially probabilistic association, and hence supposedly divorced from 
determinism. One of the earliest and most influential attempts is Hans 
Reichenbach’s The Direction of Time, where the Principle of the Common Cause 
(PCC) is first stated. The programme gains its full and most developed 
expression in Patrick Suppes’ epoch-making 1970 book, A Probabilistic Theory 
of Causality. In spite of the fact that these were both explicit attempts at building 
a stochastic theory of causality, it remains controversial just how much they 
depart as a matter of fact from the c=d identity. In particular regarding the PCC 
                                                     
1 See (Heisenberg, 1958) and (von Neumann, 1955). 
2 See (Fine, 1982b, Fine, 1982a) and (van Fraassen, 1982). The original theorems are 
due to Suppes and Zanotti (1981). 
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some philosophers have gone on to argue that the assumption of screening-off is 
only valid for deterministic, or quasi-deterministic common causes, but does not 
hold for probabilistic causes. Hence philosophers have for a very long time now 
considered that the c=d identity is controversial, although they have disagreed 
among themselves as to whether it should be rejected altogether, or weakened in 
some interesting sense.3 
The disagreement over rejection vs. weakening goes a long way to explaining 
why the status of causation in quantum mechanics also remains controversial. A 
weak version of the c=d identity is at the heart of a condition that was widely 
discussed among philosophers of physics in the early 1990’s in connection with 
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, namely Michael Redhead’s 
robustness. The consensus reached then was by and large that robustness is too 
strong a condition on probabilistic causality. So the failure of robustness in the 
EPR set-up is uninformative, and a causal account of the EPR correlations 
remains an open option. 
The current debate on causal inference has moved to a discussion of the 
Causal Markov Condition (CMC), a sophisticated version of the PCC for directed 
acyclic graphs.4 The condition employs a similarly weak version of the c=d 
identity, and remains equally controversial. But it has not been systematically 
applied to the EPR case, nor has the connection been made explicit to the 
robustness condition discussed in the early 1990’s. Our main aim in this paper is 
to make an explicit link between CMC and robustness in the context of the EPR 
correlations. Thus we aim to show that the application of CMC to the EPR 
correlations is exactly as informative (or uninformative, depending on taste) as 
robustness. Both conditions hold or fail for the same types of systems. So a 
defender of the weak version of the c=d identity will find the failure of both 
CMC and robustness in the EPR correlations revealing of a striking failure of 
causality in quantum mechanics —and there is a sense in which this result 
vindicates the founding parents’ suspicion that the probabilistic nature of 
quantum mechanics is what underlies the failure of causality. But those who are 
inclined to reject the c=d identity altogether are likely to draw rather the opposite 
lesson: the failure of CMC and robustness is precisely what is to be expected 
given the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanical causation. Although there 
is thus no essential superiority, in the context of the EPR correlations, to 
discussing CMC over robustness we aim to show that the application of CMC is 
sharper and less cumbersome. Thus we shall urge that the debate over the causal 
status of the EPR correlations is best continued in the new terms laid down by the 
Causal Markov Condition. 
2  EPR and Quantum Correlations 
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen first introduced the so-called EPR thought 
                                                     
3 And several philosophers have gone as far as to defend that causality and determinism 
in fact exclude each other. See (Hoefer, 2004) for a recent example. 
4 Cf. (Hausman and Woodward, 1999), (Cartwright, 2002) and (Steel, 2005). 
4 
experiment in 19355 as an argument to suggest that the then young and emergent 
quantum theory did not provide a complete description of reality. In a later 
refined version presented by David Bohm, two entangled electrons are emitted 
from a source in opposite directions. The spin component of each of the electrons 
can be later detected (measured) when the electrons hit a fluorescent screen after 
having passed through an inhomogeneous magnetic field (produced by a Stern-
Gerlach magnet). 
Several features of this experiment are potentially relevant. First, we will 
denote by a and b the value of the spin variable of each electron which, in the 
singlet state, can be either ‘spin-up’ (↑) or ‘spin-down’ (↓) with probability 1/2. 
We can then denote the corresponding measurement outcome events on each 
particle as ↑a, ↓a, ↑b and ↓b. Second, it is assumed that the state of the 
entangled electron pair is the singlet state:  
 
| | | |( ).
2
1
baba=Ψ ↑↓−↓↑  
  
Third, it is assumed that measurement events at each wing of the experiment, 
such as ↑a, and ↓b, are space-like separated events, i.e. lie outside each other’s 
light cone. This is best represented in the diagram of Figure 1 as the statement 
that no time-like world-line can reach from b to a or vice versa. Under a 
conventional albeit controversial interpretation of special relativity, such events 
can not be causally connected.6   
                                                     
5 (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 1935). 
6 See (Maudlin, 1994) for a critical discussion. 
 
 
Figure 1: Spacetime representation of a typical EPR experiment. 
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Quantum mechanics allows us to calculate conditional and joint probabilities 
for the different possible outcomes on both wings. When those calculations are 
performed on the singlet state, correlations between these outcomes are derived. 
The EPR correlations between the different outcome events in both wings of the 
experiment can be succinctly expressed as:  
( ) ( ) ( ).bpapbap ⋅≠∧  
 
These are the EPR correlations, which have been often positively tested in 
experiment, and for which we would like to know whether they are the result of 
underlying causal processes, and which processes. An attempt to determine an 
answer to these questions was carried out in the late 1980’s by the distinguished 
British philosopher of physics Michael Redhead.  
3  Redhead’s Robustness 
Redhead introduced his robustness condition in 19877 in order to argue that no 
direct causal relation could be established between the outcome events of an 
EPR-type experiment. The claim was part of Redhead’s attempt at showing that 
quantum mechanics and relativity can peacefully coexist. Under the presumption 
that only timelike related events can be causally connected, the measurement 
outcome events a and b in an EPR experiment can not be causally connected. In 
particular, Redhead suggested that the EPR correlations were not what he called 
robust causal connections. This in turn entitled him to discard direct causal links 
between EPR correlated events:8 
 
“A stochastic causal connection between two physical magnitudes a 
and b pertaining to two separated systems A and B is said to be 
robust if and only if there exist a class of sufficiently small 
disturbances acting on B (A) such that b (a) screens off a (b) from 
these disturbances. 
Denoting the disturbance action on B by d, then the first part of this 
condition can be rendered formally as  
( ) ( )[ ]( )baba ε=b|ε=ap=dε=b|ε=apDdD ∧∈∀∃  
A similar condition can be written down for disturbances acting on 
A. The requirement of robustness as a necessary condition for a 
causal relation means that sufficiently small disturbances of either 
relata do not affect the causal relation.”  
                                                     
7 (Redhead, 1987). 
8 (Redhead, 1987, pp. 102-3). 
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The intuition that underlies Redhead’s robustness is both simple and powerful, 
and is best brought out by a simplified version of the condition. First, let us 
simplify Redhead’s terminology by identifying physical quantities and the 
corresponding events. Typically A, B denote a quantity (variable), while a, b 
denote a value of the corresponding quantity. Hence A, B are capable of entering 
in causal relations, while a, b are capable of standing in probabilistic relations. 
However, for convenience, and without loss of generality, we will run them 
together. Thus a, b will denote indistinctly the quantites and their values; which 
is which should be clear from the context. We will then say in general that a 
stochastic causal link between two quantities a and b is robust if and only if the 
statistical relation p(a|b) is invariant under small disturbances d acting on the 
putative cause b. In other words b is a robust cause of a if and only if p(a|b ∧ d) = 
p(a|b). We can see that the intuition behind Redhead’s robustness is that it does 
not matter to the causal link between b and a how the putative cause b comes 
about, only that it does so (see Figure 2¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la 
referencia.).  
It is worth mentioning that initially Redhead apparently took robustness to be 
both necessary and sufficient for a causal link, but in response to criticism he 
weakened this to a necessary condition only.9 In any case robustness is 
understood to be at least a necessary condition on a causal link. So it becomes 
superfluous to speak of a robust causal link, since no link that fails to be robust 
can on this understanding be causal: there is no such a thing as a non-robust 
causal link. The double terminology points already to what will be the heart of 
                                                     
9 For a discussion see (Healey, 1992b). 
 
 
Figure 2: Redhead’s Robustness for EPR correlations. 
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the problem. For Redhead defines robustness as a statistical condition. Hence 
“robust causal link” is really a heterogeneous combination of a statistical 
condition and a causal relation. In stating that robustness is a necessary condition 
on a causal link Redhead is stipulating that the presence of the causal relation 
always necessarily implies the statistical condition. So there is a necessary 
statistical consequence of the existence of a causal relation. As we shall see the 
critics of robustness quickly pointed out that the statistical condition was not 
general enough to cover all kinds of probabilistic causes, but rather entailed a 
particular pseudo-deterministic assumption on the working of the cause. The 
situation is entirely analogous in the recent debate over the Causal Markov 
Condition. 
4  Healey on Robustness 
The publication of Redhead’s work on robustness attracted considerable attention 
and gave rise to an engaging debate on causation in quantum mechanics in 
general and in EPR in particular. One of the staunchest critics of robustness is 
Richard Healey, who discussed and criticised the condition at length in two 
papers published in the early 1990’s.10 In these papers Healey cast doubts upon 
the validity of robustness as a criterion for causal inference. His arguments are 
designed to show that robustness is not a necessary condition in general for a 
causal link. Our thesis in this paper is that in the context of the EPR correlations 
the debate over the Causal Markov Condition recapitulates the debate over 
robustness, so it is worth reviewing the latter in a little detail. 
Healey first pointed out that robustness, as defined by Redhead (see 
Section 3), can only be taken to be a necessary condition on total causes. In other 
words, robustness can only be a necessary condition on a causal link between b 
and a as long as no other causes are operating on a (see Figure 2¡Error! No se 
encuentra el origen de la referencia.).11 
In order to deal with cases in which b is only a partial cause of a, Healey 
introduced a new condition, which he called internal robustness:12 
  
“A stochastic relation between two events h, k is internally robust 
just in case p(h|k) is invariant under all (sufficiently small) 
modifications in the causal antecedents of k that leave k fixed and 
preserve independent causal antecedents of h.”  
We may rephrase this condition in our terminology as follows. A stochastic 
causal link between a and b is internally robust if and only if the statistical 
                                                     
10 (Healey, 1992a, Healey, 1992b). 
11 We will not here assess this claim, since the aim of the paper is not to evaluate but to 
compare robustness and the Causal Markov Condition, and to show that they face 
similar difficulties and challenges. 
12 (Healey, 1992b
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relation p(a|b) is invariant under small disturbances d which leave b and all the 
independent causal antecedents of a fixed. That is a stochastic causal link 
between quantities a and b is internally robust iff p(a|b ∧ d ∧ c) = p(a|b ∧ c) and 
d does not causally affect c, where c is the set of all independent causal 
antecedents of a. 
Healey finds both conditions problematic as criteria for causal inference: 
robustness is problematic because we are very rarely in a position to know that b 
is the total cause of a, and so a violation of robustness in practice will say 
nothing informative about whether or not there is a direct causal link between a 
and b. Robustness may fail because b does not cause a, but it may also fail 
because we are not accounting for a third partial cause c of a. More specifically 
in the quantum case it is impossible to know whether the measurement outcome 
event b in one wing is the only cause of the measurement outcome event a in the 
other wing, and hence impossible to know in advance whether a failure of 
robustness implies no causal relation between b and a or is simply due to the 
presence of third causes. Similarly for internal robustness: we are never in a 
position to know whether the small disturbances on b have in fact no causal 
effect upon some of the causal antecedents of a other than b. So as a criterion for 
causal inference internal robustness is just as unhelpful: a failure of internal 
robustness might mean that b is not even a partial cause of a, but it might also 
mean that there are other unaccounted partial causes of a besides b that are in 
turn effects of causes of b.  
Redhead’s response to these criticisms was to assert that “at some stage in the 
process of incorporating antecedents in the total cause, robustness must be 
rescued. Otherwise we would live in a ‘marshmallow’ world where the notion of 
cause would not, I believe, be appropriate.”13 In other words, whatever our 
                                                     
13 Cf. (Redhead, 1987, p. vi). 
 
Figure 3: Healey's Internal Robustness. 
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cognitive and epistemic limitations, a causal relation is properly causal only if 
robust in actual fact when all other causes have been accounted for. So in other 
words Redhead’s most considered view is that while robustness is not helpful in 
general as a criterion for positive causal inference, its failure nonetheless allows 
some minimal negative causal inference. In the EPR case this allows him to say 
at least that a failure of robustness between the outcome events on both wings b 
and a definitely implies that b is not the total or only cause of a. Redhead 
identified robust causality with action at a distance, and distinguished it from 
what Abner Shimony14 called passion at a distance, a kind of nomic acausal 
stochastic link between variables that are ‘holistically’ implicated —whatever 
that might mean. The application of the robustness condition to the EPR set-up 
was designed to show that quantum phenomena exhibits passion rather than 
action at a distance. This in turn was argued to be enough to warrant peaceful 
coexistence with special relativity. 
The critics of robustness did not rest content at this point however, but went 
on to argue against robustness as a necessary condition on causation in general.15 
In other words, they came to dispute the very idea that causal links are 
Markovian in the way specified by either robustness or internal robustness. 
However, our aim in this paper is not to evaluate robustness and internal 
robustness as necessary conditions on total and partial causes; so we will not 
review this debate. Our main aim here is to more modestly show that robustness 
in the EPR case follows logically from the Causal Markov Condition. We 
consequently argue that discussion regarding causality in EPR is best conducted 
in terms of the CMC.  
5  The Causal Markov Condition 
The Causal Markov Condition (CMC) is inspired by the Principle of the 
Common Cause (PCC) and is a keystone and crucial assumption in the most 
powerful contemporary programs of causal inference. It is intended as a 
generalised version of the PCC and can be defined, following Hausman and 
Woodward, as follows:16 
 
Causal Markov Condition (CMC): For all distinct variables X and 
Y in the variable set V, if X does not cause Y then  
( )( ) ( )( ),XPar|Xp=XParY|Xp ∧  
                                                     
14 Cf. (Shimony, 1984). 
15 Cf. (Healey, 1992a, Healey, 1992b) and (Cartwright and Jones, 1991). 
16 See (Hausman and Woodward, 1999, p. 523). Note that Hausman and Woodward’s 
definition is distinct in some significant ways from the original in Spirtes, Glymour 
and Scheines (2000 [1993], p. 29) —see (Steel, 2006) for a discussion. The distinction 
makes no difference to our argument, however, so we ignore it here —and instead 
stick to Hausman and Woodward’s definition for consistency. 
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where Par(X) (read parents of X) is the set of all direct causes of X 
in V.  
The Causal Markov Condition is an extrapolation of the PCC to directed 
acyclic graphs. The PCC states that a common cause screens-off its effects from 
each other, as long as there are no direct causal links between these effects. The 
CMC more generally states that the parents of X (Par(X)) screen-off X from any 
other variable Y in the variable set V that is not a direct causal descendent of X. 
In short: if X does not cause Y in V, then Par(X) will screen them off. The 
contraposition is rather useful in the EPR set-up: if the putative parent of one of 
the measurement outcome events, say a, does not screen it off from the other 
outcome event b then it follows that a does not cause b, or we have not identified 
the only putative parent. In the EPR scenario it is often assumed that (i) the two 
measurement outcome events can not be causally connected because of 
relativistic constraints, and (ii) that the only putative common parent of such 
measurement oucome events is the singlet state at the source. So the residual 
correlation between the events a and b which does not disappear when CMC is 
applied, must be accounted by some rather mysterious nomic and acausal 
mechanism.17 This of course is very much in line with Readhead’s thought that 
underlying the EPR correlations are non-robust stochastic links that are 
unthreatening to special relativity. It will then not come as a surprise that there is 
a strong formal connection between the CMC and the robustness conditions. 
6  Robustness and the Causal Markov Condition 
We show in this section that robustness is indeed a consequence of applying the 
Causal Markov Condition to an EPR setting, given some additional assumptions. 
In fact we show this for both of Healey’s conditions by simply applying the 
Causal Markov Condition to total and partial causes respectively. 
6.1  Total Causes and the Causal Markov Condition 
Let us first consider robustness. Let us suppose that b is the total cause of a. In 
this case b is the set of all parents of a. That is:  
 
(I) If b is the total cause of a, then Par(a) = b. 
 
Let us first assume, following robustness, that there exist a small disturbance 
d on the putative parents of a, and let us substitute d in for the term Y in the 
expression of CMC:  
 
(II) ∃ d: d = Y.   
 
                                                     
17 See (Hausman and Woodward, 1999, pp. 564-7) and (Hausman, 1999). 
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Let us then assume that the measurement outcome event a is not a cause of 
the small disturbance, i.e. let us assume: 
 
(III) a does not cause d. 
 
And finally let us turn to the definition of the Causal Markov Condition 
CMC given in the previous section. By substitution it follows from (I), (II), (III) 
and CMC that: 
 
( ) ( ),b|ap=bd|ap ∧  
 
which is an explicit expression of robustness. Thus we have formally shown that 
under assumptions (II) and (III): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ).RobustnessovCausalMarkTotalCause ⇒∧  
 
In other words under the assumption of the existence of independent 
distubing causes, robustness is the consequence of applying the Causal Markov 
Condition to total causes. 
6.2  Internal Robustness, Partial Causes and the Causal Markov 
Condition 
Now let us turn to internal robustness and partial causes. Let us then suppose 
that b is a partial cause of a. It follows that there is a non-empty set of additional 
variables c that represent all other independent causal antecedents of a. Let us 
simplify by bringing them all under an additional variable c in the causal graph. 
Then the complete set of parents of a in the graph is the union of c and b:  
 
(I') If b is partial cause of a, then: Par(a) = {b, c}.  
 
Let us assume, as before, the existence of a small disturbance d on the 
putative parents of a in place of Y in the expression of CMC:  
 
(II) ∃ d: d = Y.  
 
And similarly, that the measurement outcome event a is not a cause of the 
small disturbance, i.e. that: 
 
(III) a does not cause d.  
 
By substitution, it follows from (I'), (II) and (III) and the CMC that:  
12 
 
( ) ( ),cb|ap=cbd|ap ∧∧∧  
 
which is Healey’s internal robustness. Thus we have formally shown that under 
the same assumptions (II) and (III): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ).bustnessInternalRoovCausalMarksePartialCau ⇒∧  
 
Under the assumption of independent disturbing causes, internal robustness is a 
consequence of applying Causal Markov to partial causes.18 
6.3  Robustness updated 
We have shown that robustness and internal robustness are consequences of 
applying the Causal Markov Condition to the measurement outcome events a and 
b. If b is taken to be a total cause of a then the CMC together with some special 
assuptions entails robustness. If on the other hand b is taken to be merely a 
partial cause of a then the CMC with the same assumptions entails internal 
robustness. So it seems that the intuition underlining Michael Redhead’s 
conditions is as a matter of fact the Causal Markov Condition. And the contrary 
intuitions and arguments by their critics are conversely related to doubts 
regarding the Causal Markov Condition. The CMC backs up Redhead’s 
robustness, so if CMC is false in general as many recent critics believe,19 then 
robustness is left without substantial justification. The failure of robustness in 
EPR established by Redhead would be without any consequences were it not 
backed up by the CMC.  
Moreover we have shown that a failure of Redhead’s conditions entails a 
failure of the CMC regardless of whether the putative link is taken to be a total 
or a partial cause. So the distinction between total and partial causes that seemed 
so important in the early 1990’s now seems irrelevant. The Causal Markov 
Condition is what underlies Redhead’s intuition regardless. Similarly Healey’s 
subtle distinctions between kinds of robustness are now seen to be irrelevant for 
a proper assessment of the causal nature of the EPR correlations. The peaceful 
coexistence between quantum mechanics and relativity so sought after by 
philosophers in the early 1990’s is to be achieved always at the cost of a violation 
of the CMC, regardless of the underlying causal structure. So philosophers of 
physics interested in the issue of coexistence would be well adviced to turn to a 
careful and detailed analysis of the implications of the CMC to the EPR 
correlations. This is essentially the central claim of our paper, and we find it 
remarkable that it needs to be made. But indeed it does, for such an analysis has 
not yet been carried out. We can at best find the outlines in the very brief 
                                                     
18 A referee pointed out that the role of total or partial cause in these proofs is to make 
sure that d can only cause a via b in the case of total cause, and via {c, b} in the case 
of partial cause. Indeed that would be an alternative definition of Healey’s terms. 
19 (Cartwright, 2002) and (Williamson, 2005). 
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discussion of EPR in Hausman and Woodward20, and in a a recent paper by 
Daniel Steel21. 
7  EPR and the Causal Markov Condition 
It has been claimed (for example by Salmon22) that many genuinely statistical 
phenomena violate the PCC. Most prominently the EPR correlations are 
supposed to provide a set of established correlations that can not be explained by 
either a direct cause or a common cause model under the strictures of PCC.23 
Yet an important part of Hausman and Woodward’s defence of CMC is that 
EPR is no counterexample.24 They do not claim that the CMC is satisfied by the 
EPR correlations, but rather that it is inapplicable: it is neither satisfied nor 
violated, simply inappropriate. The discussion interestingly brings out some 
crucial differences between on the one hand the PCC as usually understood and 
on the other the CMC and the robustness conditions. So we review it briefly 
here. 
7.1  Causal Markov, Interventions and Modularity 
The key difference between the usual statement of the PCC and the CMC is the 
assumption of invariance under intervention that, according to Hausman and 
Woodward underlies and motivates CMC. This is best expressed in the 
modularity condition:25 
 
Modularity (MOD): For all subsets Z of the variable set V, there is 
some non-empty range R of values of members of Z such that if one 
intervenes and sets the value of the members of Z within R, then all 
equations except those with a member of Z as dependent variable (if 
there is one) remain invariant.  
Hausman and Woodward take this condition, in conjunction with a few 
others, to provide the grounds for the CMC. The set V is the set of variables in 
the causal graph, and the equations are the linear regression equations that 
characterise a causal system. Modularity as a condition on causal systems is then 
the thought that a relation between two quantities a and b is causal only if (i) it is 
possible at least in principle to intervene in order to set the values of a and b and 
their probabilities, and (ii) these interventions —as long as within a permissible 
                                                     
20 (Hausman and Woodward, 1999). 
21 (Steel, 2005). 
22 (Salmon, 1984, ch. 7). 
23 One of us has argued against this common lore (Suárez, 2007). However, these 
arguments do not vindicate the PCC as usually stated but a very different 
reformulation. We will not review this literature here, but instead refer the reader to 
that paper. 
24 See (Hausman, 1999) and (Hausman and Woodward, 1999). 
25 Cf. (Hausman and Woodward, 1999, p. 545). 
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range— leave intact the functional connections between the values of a and b, or 
their probabilities.26 
The statement of MOD is a conditional with an antecedent that may be false, 
so a truth-functional interpretation as a material implication would entail that 
MOD is true by default in all such cases. But the context of the discussion 
suggests that MOD is meant to be non-applicable in such cases. That is, if 
interventions are possible in some set V and equations do not remain invariant 
then modularity is false. But if, on the other hand, interventions are not possible 
for some subset Z of V then MOD is strictly speaking not false but non-
applicable.  
Hausman and Woodward’s strategy is to attempt to back up CMC by appeal 
to MOD. But some significant additional assumptions are required to show 
MOD and CMC equivalent, namely: (i) causal sufficiency i.e. that all common 
causes are included in the set V; (ii) the assumption that all correlations have 
causal explanation; and (iii) the assumption that there exist unrepresented causes 
which can play the role of interventions. There is no need to get into the details 
of the equivalence proof, although it is worth mentioning that it has been 
contested.27 In this paper we assume for the sake of argument that the proof is 
valid, and that a failure of CMC entails a failure of either of these conditions. 
This has consequences for the discussion of the EPR correlations as we shall 
see. It also helps to distinguish subtly robustness from the usual statement of the 
PCC. For the PCC makes no implicit or explicit reference to interventions. By 
contrast, the notion of ‘disturbance’ required by robustness is clearly akin to an 
intervention. Hence a system that allows no interventions at all on any of its 
variables even in principle (or countenances no small disturbances) might violate 
the PCC without violating robustness.28 This is the line defended by Hausman 
and Woordward with respect to the EPR correlations.29 Their argument is 
essentially that there is no possible way to intervene on either of the distant 
measurement events. Consequently, they argue, it is impossible in this set-up to 
evaluate the CMC: the EPR correlations can not be shown to be a 
counterexample. This is precisely the claim we take issue with in this paper. 
7.2  Interventions in EPR 
The main aim of this paper is to urge that the debate over possible causal 
explanations of the EPR correlations ought to move to a detailed discussion of 
the CMC and its presuppositions in the context of the EPR experiment. Thus we 
oppose Hausman and Woodward’s thought that CMC is inappropriate for the 
                                                     
26 The qualification of values or probabilities is needed to account for probabilistic 
causality, which Hausman and Woodward define as deterministic causation of 
probabilities (Hausman and Woodward, 1999, p. 570). 
27 See e.g. (Cartwright, 2002). 
28 The observation is consistent with our results in the previous section, since we 
showed that CMC entails robustness but not that modularity entails robustness —the 
main difference is clear now. 
29 See (Hausman, 1999) and (Hausman and Woodward, 1999). 
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EPR correlations. On the contrary we believe it is an appropiate kind of condition 
to apply, but we just do not share the widespread intuition that CMC (or the 
PCC) necessarily fails for the EPR correlations. We argue instead that whether or 
not CMC holds depends very much on the details of the precise causal 
hypothesis under test. The question requires investigation and can not be brushed 
aside as speedily as Hausman and Woodward would like. 
In a sense we believe we have already achieved this aim —it follows from 
the equivalence proof in Section 6. Hence the paper so far may be taken as 
endorsement of the suitability of CMC for understanding the status of causality 
in quantum phenomena. However, in this final section we outline our 
disagreement with the particular conclusions that Hausman and Woodward draw 
concerning the EPR correlations.  
Hausman and Woodward back up the CMC with MOD. So to evaluate their 
claims we must concern ourselves with whether interventions are possible in the 
EPR context, and what significance must be attached to this fact. Hausman and 
Woodward endorse the view that in the EPR set-up there are no distinct 
mechanisms in the wings of the experiment because in fact there are no different 
systems to speak of. Both entangled particles are just ‘parts’ of the same 
irreducible holistic or non-separable system.30 Together with the fact that there is 
no way to control the outcome of the first measurement this indeed seems to 
entail that interventions to set the values of the outcome events a and b, 
separately or jointly, are impossible. They conclude that EPR is no 
counterexample to MOD or CMC, but rather that these conditions are 
inappropriate in this context.  
However, note that CMC states nothing whatever regarding interventions. It 
neither requires nor disallows interventions. Hausman and Woodward justify 
CMC by appeal to MOD, and the latter condition certainly requires 
interventions. But CMC could in principle be justified by other means that do not 
require MOD, as long as some of the additional assumptions are forfeited. So, 
contrary to what Hausman and Woodward seem to claim, the applicability of 
CMC does not seem to turn on the applicability of MOD and the related 
availability of interventions.  
We have already noted that both MOD and CMC are explicitly stated as 
conditions on either values or probabilities of variables in the variable set V. In 
cases of genuine probabilitistic causation the only relevant factor are the 
probabilities of the variables, since the causal structure fails to determine the 
values themselves. And it is of course well known that deterministic local hidden 
variables are ruled out for quantum mechanics by the Bell inequalities. Hence the 
EPR correlations are potentially a paradigm but subtle case of probabilistic 
                                                     
30 They refer extensively to an old paper by Skyrms that defends this view (Skyrms, 
1984); it is worth mentioning that the literature on EPR has moved on a very great 
deal in the last two decades, particuarly on the physics side. Quantum entanglement 
was not then the area of intense research among physicists that it has become now, 
and Skyrms’ views were much more entrenched twenty five years ago than they are 
now among both physicists and philosophers. 
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causality.  
Interventions are not impossible to set the probabilities of some of these 
outcomes in the appropriate circumstances. For notice that the experimenter 
controls the settings of the measurement apparata that determine the direction of 
spin that gets meausured on each wing. Let us refer to the two wings of the 
experiment and their corresponding particles as ‘1’ and ‘2’. It is true that the 
spherical symmetry of the singlet state entails that the first measurement outcome 
in the laboratory rest frame always has probability one half, regardless of what 
direction one measures spin along. Suppose then that in that frame spin is 
measured on ‘1’ first, and suppose the outcome correspoding to ‘spin-up’ is 
found. If this information is provided to the second experimenter on time to set 
the direction of spin measured on particle ‘2’ she can then easily set her 
measurement device to definitely get the outcome corresponding to ‘spin-down’ 
with probability one (or indeed any other probability but zero). For any value of 
probability of ‘spin-down’ on particle ‘2’ she can use quantum mechanics to 
calculate the appropriate direction of measurement and set her device 
accordingly.  
So it turns out that interventions are possible in particular experimental EPR 
set-ups. Notice that the intervention does not just consist in choosing a frame; 
rather given any frame, an intervention is the setting of a polariser direction. In 
such set-ups the question is then whether MOD and CMC hold. We urge in this 
paper that this is the relevant question to ask for causal modellers of EPR; but we 
will not attempt a comprehensive answer here. The answer is complicated and 
depends on the details of the causal hypotheses under test.31 A brief and intuitive 
argument suggests that CMC may fail here. The EPR correlations are not 
screened-off by the creation event at the source. Similarly the value of the setting 
of the measurement device on ‘2’ will not screen-off the outcome event in that 
wing from the outcome event in the distant wing. But this really says nothing 
about a direct causal link between the wings. And if CMC failed for 
indeterministic systems, as some authors argue, then a common cause structure 
underlying the direct cause link would also be possible, which means that CMC 
might fail for a and b too. However, this claim requires further investigation in 
the context of alternative causal hypotheses. For our purposes in this paper this is 
a side issue, since whatever the correct answer it will already show that CMC is 
applicable to the EPR correlations in spite of Hausman and Woodward’s claims 
to the contrary. 
7.3  Causal Markov and Other Interpretations 
The argument we have just given shows that in any EPR experiment there always 
exists a subset of the relevant variables that are susceptible to intervention. This 
leaves open several causal accounts for the EPR correlations. The fate of the 
CMC very much depends on the details of each account. But we believe that a 
stronger claim can be made. So far we have been assuming the standard or 
orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. So we have assumed that the 
                                                     
31 For a preliminary account see  (Cartwright and Suárez, 2000). 
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violation of the Bell inequalities in the EPR experiments is due to a failure of 
what is known as outcome independence, and correspodingly that the only 
possible causes of each measurement outcome event are the distant outcome 
event and the proximate measurement device setting event.  
In other words we have assumed that it is meaningless to suppose that the 
setting events in each wing can be a causal influence upon the distant outcome 
events. But it is well known that on some interpretations of quantum mechanics 
this is not just allowed but likely. The paradigm case is Bohm’s theory. On the 
account of the EPR correlations provided in Bohmian mechanics,32 the actual 
measurement outcome event on one wing has no influence upon the 
measurement outcome event on the other wing, because in Bohm’s theory 
measurements simply reveal values that are already there, they do not bring these 
values into being. Yet the setting of the distant device does have a putative causal 
influence, since it affects the quantum wavefunction of both particles in 
configuration space, and thus affects the probabilities for outcomes in the distant 
wing. (The distant setting does not determine the proximate outcome of course, 
which also depends on the initial wavefunction state and the initial complete state 
of both particles; but it does partly determine the outcomes' probabilities). 
Daniel Steel33 has claimed that Bohm’s theory shows that CMC can fail for 
deterministic systems. The claim is part of a larger argument in the debate over 
whether the CMC is satisfied only by deterministic, or more generally ‘pseudo-
deterministic’, systems.34 Steel argues that the key to the validity of the CMC is 
not whether the system is deterministic or pseudo-deterministic but rather 
whether there are exogenous variables that are probabilistically independent from 
any other variable in the causal strucutre. Bohm’s theory is an important part of 
the argument because it is the only example that Steel provides of a deterministic 
system that does not satisfy CMC. In other words Bohm's version of the EPR 
experiment is presented as a plausible counterexample to the claim that 
determinism grounds the CMC. Presumably, given Steel’s argument, this must be 
the case because there are some probabililistically independent exogenous 
random variables in Bohm’s description of EPR. We shall study this claim 
closely. 
But first let us note some relevant differences between Steel’s overall 
argument for CMC and Hausman and Woodward’s defence of CMC by means  
of the proof of the equivalence of MOD and CMC. Steel does not claim that 
interventions are required for CMC. (Neither are they required by the letter of 
CMC, nor are they required to ground CMC).35 But he does think interventions, 
                                                     
32 See (Cushing, 1985, pp. 82-95) for a very nice review.  
33 Cf. (Steel, 2005). 
34 By pseudo deterministic system we mean a system with causes that do not fix the 
ocurrence of all their effects, but that can nonetheless be “embedded in another more 
complete graph [...] in which the parents of the given effect are sufficient to fix the 
value of the effect”. (Cartwright, 1999). For a discussion and a reference to the 
notorious cheap but dirty factory example of the presumed failure of CMC in 
indeterministic systems see  (Cartwright, 1993). 
35  (Steel, 2006). 
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by means of controlled experiments, are one way of securing the independence of 
exogenous variables that does ground CMC. And in his view there is no more 
reason to expect the method to work in indeterministic contexts. This is a crucial 
difference between the accounts and it explains Steel's desire to find a 
counterexample to the c=d identity and the related claim that the CMC is linked 
to determinism. Note in  this respect that although we disagree with Steel's claim 
to have found a counterexample in Bohm's theory, we do not necessarily disagree 
with the claim that the c=d identity is false, nor with the concommittant claim 
that CMC might be valid for indeterministic and not just deterministic systems. 
Since it is not the aim of this paper to debate the general validity of CMC we 
will not assess these general arguments. We are interested though in assessing the 
chances of CMC for the EPR correlations. And we conjecture that the fate of the 
CMC in EPR is extremely sensitive to both the details of the causal hypothesis 
under test and the interpretation of quantum mechanics that is adopted.  
So does the Bohmian description of the EPR correlations violate CMC?  
Steel assumes that it does since it predicts the very same EPR correlations. As he 
writes:  
 
[...] the EPR example is a problematic basis for the claim that the 
CMC is a more reliable assumption for deterministic than 
indeterministic systems for the simple reason that there is a fully 
deterministic (though heterodox) interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, namely Bohm’s. Bohm’s quantum theory predicts 
precisely the same non-local (and hence putatively non-causal) 
correlations in the EPR example as the standard, indeterministic 
interpretation. Hence it is far from clear that the blame for the 
(putative) counter-example can be laid at the door of indeterminism.  
In our view this makes the very mistake to suppose that the fate of the CMC 
is independent of the details of the causal hypothesis under test. There are two 
versions or interpretations of Bohm’s theory: the minimal Bohm theory 
championed originally by Bell36, and the causal interpretation defended by 
Dewdney et al.37 and Holland38. According to the minimal interpretation, 
particles’ only primitive property is position, and there is no such thing as 
intrinsic “spin”. Instead the theory manages to produce the same predictions as 
quantum mechanics for the motion of all particles going through a Stern-Gerlach 
apparatus simply by means of the influence of the guiding field upon the particle 
though the so-called “guidance condition”.39 The causal interpretation, by 
contrast, has it that particles are endowed with the intrinsic property of spin, 
which is understood to be causally reactive to the quantum potential.40 In both 
                                                     
36 (Bell, 1982). 
37 (Dewdney et al., 1988). 
38 (Holland, 1993). 
39 The full details can be found in (Bohm and Hiley, 1993, ch. 10). See (Berkovitz, 
2007, Section 5.3.1) for a brief review.  
40 Dewdney et al. (1988, pp. 537-9); Holland (1993, chapters 10 and 11). 
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cases the causal structure is rather different and hence there is no real reason to 
expect CMC’s fate to be the same as in orthodox quantum mechanics. On the 
contrary, we would like to argue that at least in its causal interpretation the 
Bohmian description of EPR definitely satisfies the CMC.  
We have already noted that in the EPR experiment as described by Bohm the 
measurement outcome events do not cause each other, but the setting events have 
an influence upon the outcomes. On the minimal interpretation, the settings 
influence the quantum wave function in configuration space in such a way that 
the motion of the particles is correspondingly affected after interaction with their 
respective Stern-Gerlach measuring devices. However, since no intrinsic property 
of spin is hypothesized, no changes take place ahead of the particle’s interaction 
with their respective measurement devices. So on Bohm’s minimal theory, the 
settings causally influence the outcomes via the measurement process only. It 
would not be correct to claim on this interpretation  that the violation of 
parameter independence entails a causal influence directly from settings to 
outcomes. 
On the causal interpretation by contrast, the settings have a direct and 
instantaneous causal influence upon both particles’ spin values. Indeed the 
underlying determinism of the theory implies that, on this causal interpretation, 
the setting events are instantaneous partial causes of the values of spin of the 
distant particles, which are only later revealed by measurement, if there ever is 
one, on the distant wing. So, on this view, my setting the measurement device of 
particle ‘1’ partially determines not just the probability of an outcome of a 
measurement on particle ‘2’ —it actually partially determines its value. The 
reason is that particles on Bohm’s theory have well defined values of their 
dynamical variables at all times —so on the causal interpretation the EPR 
particles have a value of position and spin from the word go, as they are ejected 
from the source. This value can change though at any time, and in the case of an 
entagled particles as in the EPR case, it might do so non-locally as a result of 
changes in the wavefunction. And the wavefunction is responsive not only to the 
values of the distant entangled particles but also to the features of the systems 
those distant particles interact with. Thus although essentially non-local, the 
causal Bohm theory is indeed also essentially causal, in the strong sense of the 
c=d identity that we mentioned in the introduction. 41 
                                                     
41  In response to our reasoning at this point Steel has retorted as follows (private 
correspondence): “I am not assuming that EPR is a violation of the CMC if Bohm’s 
theory is correct. Rather, I am making the following conditional claim: if locality is a 
necessary condition for causation, then EPR is a violation of the CMC according to 
Bohm’s theory”. If this is Steel’s more considerate view, it seems to us to worsen his 
position. For note that the truth of the antecedent of the above conditional claim 
would make causation impossible by definition on almost any interpretation or 
version of quantum mechanics —since some form of non-locality is required in any 
case. But, worse still, the antecedent is false precisely in Bohm’s theory, irrespective 
of interpretation: In both the minimal and the causal interpretations causation is 
certainly possible, and yet in both cases the theory is explicitly non-local. So the 
conditional above, if read as a material implication, would turn out to be vacuously 
true and entirely uninformative about the actual status of CMC in Bohmian 
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How do we evaluate CMC then? Since in Bohm’s theory measurement 
outcomes a and b do not cause each other, we can apply CMC fully as follows: 
 
Causal Markov Condition (CMC) for Bohm’s theory: For 
measurement outcome events a and b, since a does not cause b then  
( )( ) ( )( ),aPar|ap=aParb|ap ∧  
where Par(a) is the set of all direct causes of a in V. 
There is absolutely no reason to suspect that in Bohm’s theory this condition 
is false, in either the minimal or the causal versions of the theory. On the 
contrary, since in Bohm’s theory the explicit causal antecedents of the 
measurement outcomes include the quantum wavefunction, the initial complete 
states of both particles (which includes their spin in the causal interpretation)  
and the distant settings, it follows that Par (a) includes all these. And since these 
variables jointly determine the value of the outcomes a and b, they jointly 
determine their probabilities. So the CMC is trivially satisfied in the Bohmian 
description of the EPR correlations, as long as we include in the set V all those 
variables that according to the theory are effectively causal antecedents of the 
outcomes a and b. 
8  Conclusions 
Our aim in this paper has been to urge more research to be conducted on 
applying the Causal Markov Condition to the diverse models and interpretations 
of the EPR correlations. We hope to have shown that questions regarding the 
causal nature of explanations of the EPR correlations are best explored by means 
of a detailed and careful analysis of the application of the CMC. This is the right 
framework to update the debate regarding Michael Redhead’s robustness in the 
early 1990’s and to generally conduct the debate. Despite claims to the contrary 
the answers are not trivial, and the CMC is in principle applicable to the EPR 
correlation phenomena. But questions remain as to whether CMC is satisfied by 
these phenomena. We conjecture that the answer to this question is highly 
sensitive to the details of the causal hypothesis under test. We have also claimed 
it to be sensitive to the interpretation of quantum mechanics that is adopted, a 
claim that we have supported by looking at the Bohmian description of the EPR 
experiment. Contrary to recent claims the Bohmian description of the EPR 
correlations satisfies CMC. 
This suggests that the CMC is a generally valid background or 
methodological assumption for deterministic or pseudo-deterministic systems.42 It 
                                                                                                                                    
mechanics. (If read as an indicative conditional, Steel’s statement is just false). 
42 Modulo the usually discussed exceptions such as nomic or non-causal inducers of 
correlations —see e.g. (Hausman, 1999)—, and accidental dependencies such as the 
one between British bread prices and the water level in Venice in Sober’s famous 
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remains to be seen whether it can be similarly assumed for indeterministic ones 
such as EPR on the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
Concomittantly it also remains to be seen whether a causal understanding of 
indeterministic phenomena requires the CMC. Suppose that CMC fails for at 
least some of the main causal hypotheses for the EPR correlations under the 
standard or orthodox understanding. If CMC is not required for causation then 
even the weakest interpretation of the c=d identity will have been refuted. If on 
the other hand CMC is required for causation then quantum mechanical 
phenomena, on the orthodox interpretation at least, abandons causality as well as 
determinism, the c=d identity is retained, and the intuition of the founding 
parents is proved correct (for orthodox quantum mechanics at least). The 
questions are relevant, the stakes are high, and the answers should be 
informative. 
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